Re-conceptualising Labour Market Regulationin Australia and New Zealand by Barry, Michael
RE-CONCEPTUALISING LABOUR MARKET REGULATION IN 
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND 
Michael Barry 
Department of Industrial Relations, Griffith Business School, 
Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia 
Abstract 
This paper seeks to broaden traditional assumptions that the study of industrial relations makes about regulation. 
Industrial relations researchers have been interested in institutional regulation since the Webbs and Commons 
examined the development of unions, minimum standards and collective bargaining in the United Kingdom and the 
United States. This tradition provides a narrow conception of institutions as structures rather than processes. norms. 
rituals or habits. A contemporary manifestation of this narrow conception is the preoccupation of industrial relations 
researchers with changing institutional structures. such as declining levels of trade union density and the 
decentralization of bargaining structures. Often overlooked in such analyses are important questions about the 
functions institutions perform, and how these functions endure in times of institutional change. This paper outlines 
changes to the Australian and New Zealand systems of industrial relations from the 1990s, and examines how the 
systems' traditional regulatory functions continue 10 be performed following the introduction of new institutions and 
bargaining structures. 
Introduction 
Regulation is about more than states, laws, and 
enforcement mechanisms. Recent contributions to the 
literature on legal regulation suggest that regulation 
comprises a complex interrelationship between private 
(contract) and public (statute) law and between formal 
(rules) and informal (customs) regulatory tools (Collins, 
1999; Parker et al, 2004). In contrast to the popular 
assumption that privatization and contractualism mean 
less law, less regulation and less state intervention - this 
literature argues that regulation is increasing and 
expanding. In part the justification for th is view is the 
thesis that developments in science and technology are 
creating a more "risky society". At an empirical level, 
studies have demonstrated that while privatization may 
mean less state provision of goods and services, private 
provision is often underwritten by creating more law and 
new regulatory instruments and agencies. Changes to the 
regulation of industrial relations have certainly adhered to 
this tendency. 
This paper examines the regulation of the labour markets 
of Australia and New Zealand. Since the mid 1980s both 
labour markets have undergone substantial institutional 
change. In both countries, unions have suffered 
substantial decline, employer assoc tattons have 
remodeled themselves, and the dominant framework of 
compulsory arbitration has been ei ther weakened (in 
Australia) or dismantled (in New Zealand). In both 
countries there has been a transition from collective 
bargaining to individualization of the employment 
relationship, which, according to popular pronouncements 
represents a movement from a regulated to deregulated 
labour market. In dismissing the notion of a deregulated 
labour market, the aim of the paper is to highlight the 
continuities in patterns of labour market regulation that 
underlie the formal changes to institutional structures and 
bargaining instruments. 
As it seeks to explain the functions of regulation, political 
economy can offer industrial relations insights into the 
process of institutional change. In particular this paper 
applies the notion of an embedded economy - as 
developed by Karl Polanyi - to the case of labour market 
restructuring in Austral ia and New Zealand. The paper 
examines the impact of the substantial institutional 
changes introduced in both countries from the mid-1980s 
on the pattern of labour market regulation. More 
specifica lly the paper asks whether there has been a 
fundamental shift towards a market based system of 
regulation or, alternatively, whether the process of change 
has seen the emergence of new institutions that perform 
the same or similar regulatory functions. 
The first section of the paper highl ights some of the 
limitations of using a conventional industrial relations 
perspective to understand labour market restructuring. 
The second section then demonstrates the case for using a 
political economy perspective to understand the 
developments in labour market regulation. The third 
section of the paper reviews the comparat ive literature on 
Australian and New Zealand industrial relations. This 
section identifies the reasons for an explosion of interest 
in trans-Tasman comparisons in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, and highlights the shortcomings of the methods 
used to compare the respective cases of labour market 
restructuring during this period. In the face of the 
substantial institutional changes that have occurred since 
the 1980s, section four highlights examples of continuity 
in the patterns of industrial relations in both Australia and 
New Zealand. 
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Regulation and Industrial Relations 
A general definition of industrial relations might be the 
study of the regulation of the employment relationship. 1 
Such a definition of the field reveals at least three 
important shortcomings. First, when examining the 
interaction of employment and work, most observers look 
only at the rights and obligations that stem from the 
contract of employment. Left out of the equation are a 
range of different types of employment and work 
experiences including volunteering, unpaid domestic 
labour and self-emp loyment {Edwards, 2003: 1-2). 
Second, by examining the dymanics of power, conflict 
and bargaining around the formal employment 
relationship, industrial relations research has become 
segregated from research on social security. As new 
patterns of employment such as the growth of 
casual isation have eroded the tradi tional (male) model of 
fu ll time employment, it is essential that the fields of 
industrial relations and social security together explore 
how workers ga in or lose enti tl ements and access to both 
employment. and social, protection. Safarti and Bonoli 
(.2002) wam that changing patterns of labour market 
participation, including population aging, pose significant 
challenges that require labour market policy makers to 
integrate employment protection and soc ia l securi ty. 
Third, industrial relat ions research, s ince the pioneering 
work of the Webbs in the United Kingdom and Commons 
in the Uni ted States, views regu lation as occurring 
through the rules made and administered by institutional 
' 
actors.- These ac tors include, especially in the case of 
Austra lia and New Zealand, arbitration tribunals (and 
other mechanisms of state intervention), as we ll as 
employer and employee assoc iations. At a time of 
considerable labour market restructuring, many observers 
ha' e examined the causes of institutional decay and ways 
to rcill\ igorate traditional labour market institutions. The 
most ob"ious exmnplc is the considerable literature 
de' oted to understanding, and offering suggestions to 
redress. the decline in unionization that has occurred 
~H:ro::.s a number of developed countries (eg Fairbrothcr 
and Gri !'fin 2002). The adopt ion of the so ca lled 
'\Hganizing model" has been a particular source of 
pn:occupation for Australian and New Zealand industria l 
relations researchers. 
Useful as they may be, studies that demonstrate a dec line 
in unit)nisat ion might te ll us little unless they explore the 
crucial link between unionisation and co llecti ve 
bargaining coverage, and discuss how alternati ve fonns 
or representation or regulation complement, or continue 
ttl _Perform, those funct ions in the absence of a strongly 
unlt)lll:,cJ labour movement. Examples from European 
industrial relations systems include statutory provisions 
that ex tend the coverage and benefits of collective 
bargaining from union to non-union workers, and 
alternative forms of employee representation, such as 
\\'tHk cnuncils. that have statutory rights to enable 
cmployL·e involvement in decision making at the 
Wt)rkphtcc. lt is in countries. like the United States. that 
ha\ e both low levels of unionisation and collecti ve 
bargaining coverage, that access to alternati ve forms of 
representation becomes a most Important policy 1ssue 
(Freeman and Rogers 1 999). 
By focusing on the fortunes of particular institutional 
actors, industrial relations research has then tended to 
overlook the more fundamental functions performed by 
labour market institutions and how these functions might 
be affected by institutional change. In part, there has 
tended to be an assumption that the erosion of 
institutional structures equates to a transition from a 
regulated to de-regulated labour market. If we accept that 
the market is itself a form of regulation then the notion of 
a de-regulated labour market becomes absurd (eg 
Shearing 1993). What is referred to as deregulation is 
more accurately a process of regulatory contestation in 
which societal structures of regulation may give way to 
market-oriented forms of regulation. According to Blyth 
(2002:4): 
The contemporary neo-liberal economic order . . . is an 
attempt once again to dis-embed the market from society, 
to roll back the institutions of social protection and 
replace them wi th a more market-conforming institutional 
order. 
The weakening of institutions of employment protection 
such as trade unions and arbitration tribunals has 
accompanied the decentralization of bargaining to the 
level of the firm or the individual employer/employee. 
This process does not represent a regulatory void. In the 
first place, there is a good case for seeing the firm as a 
non-market institution of regulation (Adams 1992). 
Second, whi le decentralization brings the regulation of 
the employment relationship closer to the direct parties, it 
is a process that may well be underwritten by increased 
state intervention, to strengthen the protection of 
individual rights. As Johnstone and Mitchell (2004: 11 7-
11 8) have observed: 
The withdrawal of public regulation by the state does not 
necessarily reduce the sheer amount of ' regulatory ' public 
law the return to market-based, or ' private', 
arrangements has been accompanied by a marked 
increase in regulatory instruments, norms and agencies. 
Of course, state intervention to promote individual rights 
may simultaneously weaken protections that support 
institutional collective employment regulation. 
To the extent that some traditional structures of labour 
market regulation are in decline, industrial relations needs 
to broaden its understanding of the role of different types 
and forms of regulation. Rather than viewing regulation 
as the study of institutions and their rules, we might 
suggest that regu lation in a broad sense encompasses a 
range of means, both formal and informal, to influence or 
direct behaviour. Regu lation research goes so far as to 
suggest that informal regulatory tools - such as negative 
publicity, public criticism, shaming and embarrassment -
may have a more important long term influence than 
formal sanctions (Parker and Braithwaite 2003). A similar 
approach has guided changes to the regulation of 
occupational hea lth and safety, wi th education, training 
and the input of the direct parties in developing codes of 
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conduct now playing an increasingly important role, with 
legal prosecutions reserved for the worst offenders. 
A Political Economy Perspective 
In order to better understand and compare institutional 
functions it is useful to look beyond industrial relations to 
broader theoretical frameworks within the political 
economy or institutional economics tradition. It is 
important to note that industrial relations researchers have 
followed the stream of institutional economic thought 
developed most clearly by John Commons (Kaufman, 
1998). As well as founding one theoretical stream of 
institutional economics, Commons wrote extensively on 
American industrial and labour relations (see Hodgson 
2003). The stream of institutional economic thought 
developed by Thorstein Veblen, which views institutions 
as rituals, norms or habits of thought - rather than 
particular structures - has not been embraced by industrial 
relations researchers. Also overlooked by industrial 
relations researchers are important contributions from 
political economics, of which one of the most glari ng is 
the work of Karl Polanyi. Although increasingly 
recognised as a major contribution to twentieth century 
social science (Block 2003 ; Munck 2002), Polanyi 's work 
remains poorly understood in industrial relations despite 
its centrality to that field of study. 3 
Polanyi (J 957) claimed institutions became "embedded" 
in market exchanges because the factors of production -
land, labour and money - cannot be traded as 
commodities. Institutions brought the market back to 
society and, in the case of the labour market, provided 
workers with employment and social protection. Polanyi 
advanced the notion of a "double movement", whereby 
efforts to enable a self-regulating market would be met by 
the countervail ing force of institutions of societal 
regulation. 
Polanyi completed his most famous work The Great 
Transf ormation in the post Second World War 
environment of increased state intervention in the market 
economy. His analysis is an historical, poli tical economic 
account of the transition from the economic liberalism of 
a self-regulated market to an institutionally embedded 
welfare economy (Stanfield 1980). A key question that 
arises in a time when tradit ional labour market 
institutions are becoming dis-embedded is what 
alternative mechanisms emerge to perform the same 
institutional functions? In other words, how does the 
market remain embedded in social relations? 
In a recent reappraisal of The Great Transformation, 
Block (2003) argues that inherent in Polanyi 's thesis was 
the notion of a permanently embedded economy. Thus; 
. . . within societies, governments - even in the most 
market-oriented pol ities - continue to play a central role 
in economic li fe by organizing the key fictitious 
commodities (land, labor, and money) and by engaging in 
a wide variety of protective measures (Block 2003: 289). 
It is this notion of "permanent embeddedness" that I will 
use to frame the case of labour market regulation in the 
context of institutional change m Australia and New 
Zealand. 
Comparing Labour Market Regulation in 
Australia and New Zealand 
In comparative industrial relations, Australia and New 
Zealand are examples of most similar cases. They are 
small , neighbouring, settler societies, with close cultural 
and sport ing traditions, and histories of very similar 
labour market regulation. By the end of the 1800s or very 
early 1900s, both coun tries had extended the franchise to 
the working class (universally in New Zealand in 1893); 
elected labour representatives to parl iament, introduced 
forms of social security protection; enacted anti-sweating 
legislation; and introduced systems of compulsory 
arb itration to regulate industrial relations (Castles, 1985; 
Ramia, 1998). The advent of compulsory arbitration -
which occurred first in New Zealand, from 1894 -
produced a uniquely "Antipodean" pattern of labour 
market regulation. State agencies gained the authority to 
sett le disputes and make binding agreements (known as 
awards in both countries) that prescribed wages and 
work ing cond itions for specific occupational or industry 
groups. 
Despite these simi larities, cross-Tasman industrial 
relations research has not been well developed, apart from 
a concerted effort to compare the fates of the two systems 
during the period of 1980s and early 1990s (Bray and 
Howarth , 1993; Bray and Walsh, 1995 and 1998; Bray 
and Neilson 1996). At this time, the two systems seemed 
to have diverged quite dramatica lly. Those researching 
the period sought to explain the apparent differences 
predominantly in terms of institu tional fac tors, including 
Australia's federal political system which set limits on the 
power of the Commonwealth government to regulate 
industri al relations. By comparison the New Zealand 
system produced what some have called "elected 
dictatorships". According to this explanation, the 
difference in polit ical systems. and the absence of 
constitutional restraint , allowed regu lators in New 
Zealand to push forward reforms that were much more 
radica l than those developed in Australia (Schwartz, 
1994 ). 
The comparative research exammmg the period of the 
1980s and early 1990s is limited in a number of respects. 
Although plausib le, the institutional explanation tends to 
overl nok or simpli fy the differences in the workings of 
the systems of industrial relations in the two countries. If 
reform to the Australian system remained hamstrung by 
constitutional constraints, th is restriction has only applied 
at the federal level. Australia's "federal" political and 
industrial relations systems present j urisdictional 
complexities that have no parallel in New Zealand's 
uni tary and unicameral poli tical structure. As Ramia 
( 1998) argues, arbitration was easier to abolish in New 
Zealand than it has proven to be in Australian because 
New Zealand traditionally relied upon extra-arbitral 
mechanisms of state intervention. These have included 
the development of statutory minimum wages and equal 
employment opportunities outside the arbitral system. 
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Another weakness of the comparative research dealing 
with the 1980s and early 90s is that it examines a 
relat ive ly short period of institutional divergence. 
A vai I able research examining the period since the mid-
1990s demonstrates a trend towards institutional re-
convergence. Thus, while New Zealand reformers 
achieved substantial institutional change during the 1 980s 
and early 1990s. Australian regulators have done much to 
bridge the gap from the mid-1 990s (Wailes, 1997; Barry 
and Wailes, 2004). Moreover, given its focus on the 
1980s and 90s, the comparative research draws 
insufficient attention to the importance of earlier 
divergent trends. These included the development of 
"second tier" (or enterprise) bargaining during the 1960s 
(Walsh 1984). The loss of credibility the Arbi tration 
Court suffered following the events surrounding its 
infamous ''nil wage" order of 1968 (Walsh 1994) and 
amendments to the arbitration system introduced in 1973 
solidified and further underwrote the development of free 
collective bargaining (Boxall, 1990). That the fi nal 
abolition of compulsory arbitration in 1991 was made 
possible by earlier developments which had undermined 
the system's legitimacy has been overlooked by most 
commentators, who saw the EC A as a watershed in New 
Zealand industrial relations. 
The comparative research also fails to pay sufficient 
attention to the underlying interests that drove the 
different policy responses and institutional outcomes on 
both sides of the Tasman (Wailcs and Ramia, 2002; 
\\'ailcs. Ramia and Lansbury. 2003). Historical ly, these 
differences of interest reflected the relative importance of 
manufacturing (in Australia) as opposed to farming (in 
New Zealand) concerns. the greater extent to which peak 
organized labour became embedded in the Australian 
arbitration system (Gardner. 1995: Bray and Walsh, 
1995) and the degree to which arbitration itself operated 
alongside (as in New Zealand) or to the exclusion of (as 
in Austra lia) other mechanisms that provided 
ernrloyment and social protection ( Ramia. 1998). The 
Cl)lltribution of those who have critically reviewed the 
CL1rnparat ivc literature is to show that underlying 
institutions arc interests, and divergent interests shape 
I)Utl'l)mcs more fundanH~ntally than institutional 
structures. The i ne Ius ion of materia I interests provides a 
,·aluabk addition to the extant institutional analysis of 
i\ustr:..Jiian and New Zealand industrial relat ions. 
Institutional Change and Regulatory 
Continuity in Australia and New Zealand 
At the heart of the weakness in the comparative 
Australian!Ncw Zealand literature comparing the period 
t)f 19XOs and 90s is the assumption that labour market 
outcomes arc determined by part icular institutional 
strllctures. How and why these institutional structures 
l'merged in the first place is not emphasized. 
Cuns~qu~ntly. questions cone~m ing how and why 
~xisting institutional functions might endure under 
different institutional st ructures arc also 
u nd~remphasizcd. 
Another manifestation of the preoccupation wi th 
institutional structures rather than institutional functions 
-
is the tendency to make comparisons between countries 
with very similar institutional structures rather than 
countries with very different institutions that nevertheless 
perform very similar regulatory functions. In part the 
similarities in institutional structures of labour market 
regulation have been what has prompted comparisons 
between Australia and New Zealand, in the tradition of 
the most similar case method (see Wai les 1999). To the 
extent that many structures could be held constant, 
researchers have attributed much of the apparent 
di fference to the fewer examples of institutional 
divergence. As has been mentioned, a clear example is 
the lack of attention given to the factors that led to the 
introduction of the ECA in New Zealand compared to the 
attention given to some specific institutional outcomes 
that followed the introduction of the legislation. 
When formal inst itutional change is as substantial as it 
was in New Zealand at the time the ECA replaced the 
arbitration system in 1991, there is a tendency to consider 
the changes as representing a watershed in labour market 
deregulation, rather than as signi fy ing a change in the 
institutional structure of regulation. Although the ECA 
abolished the arbitral structures of collective employment 
regulation, the Act created new employment institutions 
and arguably strengthened existing protections of 
individual employee rights. In seeking to contextualise 
the institutional changes of the last l 0-1 5 years on the 
pattern of labour market regulations in Australia and New 
Zealand, the following discussion focuses on the affect of 
these changes on bargaining structures and on the 
relationship between bargaining instruments and 
bargaining outcomes. 
Structural Change: Arbitration vs. Bargaining 
At its peak compulsory arbitration regulated the wages 
and conditions of the vast majority of workers in both 
Australia and New Zealand. Compulsory arbitration 
funct ioned as an effective tool of labour market 
regulation because occupational or industry awards 
detcnnined, on a multi-employer basis, that wages were 
taken out of competition. This gave employers little 
reason to oppose unionization and, with the ass istance of 
tariff protection, employers in many parts of the economy 
cou ld afford to pay "fair and reasonable" wages. 
Compulsory arbitration provided a "class ic compromise" 
between the interests of employers and employees much 
as systems of collective bargaining did in other countries 
(Adams, 1981 ). 
In a changed economic climate, the Austra lian arbitration 
system has been diminished by the emergence of 
enterprise bargaining. Estimates of official data show that 
approximately 20-25 per cent of, predominantly low paid, 
employees remain "award only". A further 20 per cent of 
employees have "above award" wages built on the award 
entitlements. A larger group of 35-40 per cent of 
employees have a registered certified agreement. A 
remaining 20 per cent of employees are employed on 
individual agreements, the majority of which are 
unregistered (common law) contracts (Watson et al 
2003:112). 
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There are different interpretations of the continuing role 
arbitration plays within or alongside the now dominant 
{?) steam of enterprise bargaining. The development of 
enterprise bargaining and the award simplification 
process can be seen as having dramatically weakened the 
role of Australian Industrial Relations Commission 
(Dabscheck 2001 ; see also Burgess and Macdonald 
2003). Yet, the Commission still plays a central role in 
regulating awards, and the outcomes of other bargaining 
instruments are also set in relation to awards. Before 
certification, enterprise agreements must satisfy the 
Commission's no disadvantage test. This test also applies, 
at the Federal level, to Australian Workplace Agreements 
even though these agreements are vetted by a separate 
authority (the Office of the Employment Advocate 
(OEA)). Given this requirement, arbitration arguably 
continues to set a floor for the wages and conditions of 
the increasing proportion of employees covered by 
alternative bargaining instruments. 
In a comparative study of six union movements, Hugh 
Clegg (1976) argued that the Australian compulsory 
arbitration system was analogous to a system of collective 
bargaining. Clegg offered this assessment on the basis of 
observations about the extent of over-award bargaining 
and the ability of the parties to reach agreement through 
consent provisions. In light of the institutional changes 
introduced by successive tabor and Coalition 
governments it may be the case the structural changes 
wrought have not dramatica lly changed the pattern of 
Australian industrial relations. 
Institutionally, the New Zealand system has changed 
considerably. When the National Government abolished 
the remaining pillars of arbitration in 1991 , it replaced 
them with other employment institutions; the 
Employment Tribunal and the Employment Court. At the 
same time, the state strengthened the regulation of 
workers' individual rights by extending personal 
grievance protection to all employees. Any employee 
could file a personal grievance if they unfairly suffered a 
disadvantage in any area of employment. The transition 
from collective to individual rights was reflected in both 
the marked decline in recorded industrial disputes and the 
marked increase in personal grievance claims during the 
1990s. The ERA represents then an attempt not to re-
regulate the New Zealand labour market but rather an 
attempt to re-collectivise it through the provision of new 
supports for collective bargaining and unionization. As 
mentioned however these provisions appear more 
dramatic on paper than in practice. Moreover, while there 
are a small number of substantively different clauses in 
the ERA, there are a very large number of provisions that 
mirror those contained within the ECA. 
Bargaining Instruments and Outcomes: 
Individualization and Collectivism 
The introduction of New Zealand 's ECA signified a 
formal shift from collective employment regulation to 
individualization. In the first few years of the Act, 
unionization and formal collective bargaining coverage 
declined dramatically. However closer analys is of this 
period reveals some important continuities. As 
unionization plummeted, alternative forms of employee 
representation emerged. By the end of the ECA era. 15 
percent of the non-unionised collective work force had an 
alternative form of representation (Harbridge Crawford & 
Kiely, 2000: 16). Many of these alternative representative 
bodies became unions when the ERA introduced a new 
requirement that only unions could negotiate collective 
agreements (Barry and May 2004). 
More important to the continuity of existing patterns of 
industrial relations was the nature of the individual 
contacting that developed under the EC A. As Anderson 
( 1999) and Oxenbridge ( 1999) observed. individual 
contracting occurred predominantly on a procedural. not 
substantive, basis. For ex1stmg employees 
individualization meant that their award conditions were 
rolled over into a (possibly identical) individual 
agreement. This process happened automatically if either 
party (usually the employer) refused to negotiate a new 
collective agreement. New employees typica lly signed a 
standard form individual agreement. often on a "take it or 
leave it" basis. Under either of these scenarios. employees 
found that individual contracting offered litt le opportunity 
to actually negotiate individual terms and conditions of 
employment (MeAndrew and Ballard. 1995). 
For employers, procedural individualization had a number 
of benefi ts. For anti-union employers. procedurnl 
individual ization. coupled with other prov1s1ons 
contained wi thin the EC A. provided a means to de-
recognise unions. Although the ECA required employers 
to recognize an employee's bargaining agen t. the Act did 
not requi re the part ies to negotiate. Unions lost their 
ability to represent thei r members in the sense that they 
iost the power to compel employers to bargaining 
...:ollectivcly. espec ially on a mult i-employer basis. The 
Act also restricted the ability of un ions to gain access to 
the workplacc. Meanwhile. the Courts, particularl y the 
Court of Appeal. interpreted the Act as giving sanctity to 
the contract of employment. The courts accepted 
individual contracts even in instances where employee 
signed under duress. Procedural indiviuualiza tion enabled 
employers to offer separately to each employee an 
iden tical contract. and in "negotiations" employees would 
be unable to threaten to collec ti ve ly wi thdraw thei r labour 
to improve their bargaining posi tion. On the other hand. 
employers rea lized that substantive individualisation 
would involve considerable "transaction costs" 1n 
negot1atmg and managing separate and distinct 
agreements, as we ll as th reatening to disrupt the norms in 
the workplace. such as wage relativity. that arc 
fundamenta lly collective. 
In Australia the growth in A WAs shows the same 
tendencies. Following a very slow take up of statutory 
individua l contracting, the OEA has recently reported a 
substantia l (47 per cent) growth in A WA approvals 
between the 2002-03 and 2003-04 financial years. 
Through its online web site, the OEA provides facilities 
for companies or bargaining agents to lodge multiple 
agreements si multaneously as well as to create and save 
company templates. The online service also provides a 
range of industry templates that users can download. and 
modify should they wish to. The OEA also reports a 
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substantial increase in electronic lodgement of 
agreements (from 66 to 83 per cent) and an increase in the 
number of available framework agreements (from 13 to 
31) which, coupled with the company templates and 
multiple agreement fac ilities, suggest the growth in 
individualization may be fue lled by procedural. 
If this type of contracting commenced in New Zealand, 
under the ECA. the ERA has not reversed it. In fact, the 
ERA has created new incentives to for individuals to 
"free ride". The ERA requires employers to offer new 
employees the terms and conditions of a relevant 
collec ti ve agreement for the first 30 days of employment. 
At that point employees must elect to retain the collective 
conditions as a paid up union member or s ign and 
individual agreement. In these circumstances there is 
nothing to prevent. and no reason to not to suspect an 
emp !oyer wou Id seek to offer the identical terms and 
condi tions as an individual agreement. Although the ERA 
requires union involvement in all collective agreements, 
incentives such as this informally extend the coverage of 
collecti ve bargaining to non-union individual agreements 
(Biumenfcld et al 2004). 
Discussion 
Academic conur1entators have been at pains to explain the 
decline of unionization and collective bargaining as 
disturbing trends in labour market regulation. and they 
rnay well be. However, it is important to recognize that 
alternati ve mechanisms may offer employees continued 
protect ions in the absence of a strong union movement. In 
this respect free riding may be seen as a cost to unions but 
a benefit to non-union employees. In other words. 
provisions such as the 30 day ru le extend to both parties 
the benefits of collective bargaining without imposing 
transaction costs. and coupled with the growth in 
alternati\'e forms of employee representation, explain 
why there h::~s not been a strong growth in unionization or 
rum1al collective bargaining coverage despite the explic it 
prOllll)tion of both in the ERA. 
TuuteJ as enhancing enterprise nexibi li ty and individual 
choice. the changes that have been introduced by 
-.;ucccssi\'c conservative (and Labo(u)r) governments in 
Australia and New Zealand arc not representative of shift 
!'rum a regulated to deregulatcJ labour rnarkct. Indeed 
labour market regulation has actually increased in many 
area~. In Austra lia. the introduction of individualiza tion 
came tllf"L)lfgh the creation of a new bargaining 
instrument. Australian Workp lace Agreements (in the 
\\'RA 1996. also replicated in state legislation eg QW A). 
Attempts by the Coalition Government to regulate union 
efforts to achieve pattern barga ining arc another obvious 
e~amplc of increased state intervention. Pattern 
bargaining represented a clear example of a union 
movement's response to a conservat ivc govern rTicnt 's 
intention to diminish arbitration in favour of enterprise-
leve l barg:1 ining. In the higher educat ion sector. the 
•'" d f . . . current -t roun o unrversrty enterprrsc agreements 
maintain a substantinl number (21) of union national 
mandatory settlement po ints that severe ly restrain diverse 
outcnmes at the enterprise level. Unhappy wi th the 
union's choice of bargaining strategy that hns sought to 
preserve industry standards, the government has not 
allowed the market or the parties to resolve the question. 
Instead, the Commonwealth has attempted (once 
unsuccessfully, and there are now new provisions) to 
intervene to directly shape the regulatory environment by 
tying funding of the sector to industrial relations changes 
that weaken collective bargaining and union influence in 
university governance. The Government's initiatives in 
higher education are indicative of its broader industrial 
relations strategy. When the Government realized that the 
regulatory environment it had promoted was not 
achieving its intended outcome, its response was to 
intervene further while simultaneously preserving the 
rhetoric of state abstaining from the labour market to 
allow parties to engage in private, contractual relations. 
Although unable to pass much of its "radical" agenda 
through the Senate, the Coalition Government is now set 
to further intervene to restrain the ability of the parties to 
engage in free collective bargaining. Following the 
Coalition's recent electoral gains which enable it to 
control both Houses of Parliament, the Government has 
signaled its intention to extend unfair dismissal 
exemptions, introduce secret ballots for union industrial 
action, and in the building and construction industry, the 
Government wi ll seek to establish a new industry 
regulator to facilitate industrial relations "reform". 
Conclusion 
There has been a substantial degree of institutional 
change in the regulation of the labour markets of 
Australia and New Zealand in the last two decades. In 
terms of a comparison between the two countries, those 
who have assessed the period from the mid-1 980s to mid-
90s argued that institutional change had been more 
dramatic in New Zealand than in Australia. However, this 
assessment needs to be qualified by the view that there 
has been substantial institut ional re-convergence since the 
mid-1990s, following the election of the Commonwealth 
Coalition Government in Australia. 
While institutional change has provided a convenient 
compari son between these two cases, it tends to overlook 
some important issues in the regulation of both countries' 
labour markets. Regulation does not occur only through 
trad itional institutional structures. While measures of 
institutional change. such as the decline in unionization 
and collective bargaining, may appear to point towards a 
dis-embedded market, it is important to recognize 
patterns of continuity in labour market regulation. These 
patterns of continuity include the emergence of new 
institutional structures or actors, and even, in the case of 
New Zealand, the re-legitimization of tradi tional 
institutions. To suggest that the replacement of one 
structure of regulation with another is a case of 
dcregu lation is to engage in fantasy. It is also fantas tic to 
assume that there exists no labour market regulation m 
the absence of certain, pre-defined institutional actors. 
The political economy perspective adopted in this paper 
suggests that any attempt to enable a self-regulating 
market wi 11 be met by a protect ive societal response. As 
the EC A came to represent an attempt to allow 
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employment contracting to "commodify" labour, the 
Labour Government introduced new provisions to re-
legitimise the role of unions and collective bargaining to 
redress what Labour claimed was an inherent inequality 
in bargaining power between employers and employees. 
The available evidence suggests that the re-legitimization 
of these institutions has not had a substantial impact on 
either union density or collective bargaining coverage. 
The most dramatic effect of the ERA has been to force 
various alternative forms of employee representation to 
become unions. These associations had earlier emerged to 
provide a facility for employee representation and 
collective bargaining in the absence of statutory 
protections for collective employment regulation during 
the ECA. Whether as unions or alternative forms of 
employee representation, these bodies function as a 
means to enable employers to reach enterprise 
agreements, and enable employees to bargain ing 
collectively. 
The changes introduced by the Coal ition Government in 
Australia have not enabled a self-regulating market. The 
introduction of A WAs saw the introduction of a new 
institution charged with ensuring that agreements on 
employee outcomes could not fa ll below pre-existing 
community standards. Since tak ing up office and 
implementing its first wave of changes in 1996, the 
Government has proposed an array of amendments to 
further re-shape the industrial relations environment. 
Beneath the rhetoric of a neo-liberal agenda, the 
Government's changes seek to shape rather than fac ilitate 
bargaining structures and outcomes, particularly in the 
pockets of the labour market where employees retain the 
ability to extract major concessions from employers. 
Notes 
Flanders ( 1975) defined industria l relations as " the 
study of the institutions of job regulation". The use of 
the word regulation re flects the mainstream view that 
industria l relations is a rule making exercise, which 
according to pluralists such as Dun lop ( 1958), 
involved employees and the ir representatives, 
employers and their representat ives and government 
agencies. A Marxist definition of industria l re lations 
would substitute the word control for regulation 
(Hyman 1975: 12). 
2 For Dunlop ( 1958:vii i-ix) "The centra l task of a 
theory of industrial re lations is to explain why 
particular rules are establ ished in particular 
industrial-relations systems and how and why they 
change in response to changes affect ing the system." 
3 Polanyi's inte rpretation of labour as a fictitious 
commodity is by itself an important contribution to 
industrial re lations. Polanyi demonstrated his thesis 
on labour as a fictitious commodity by examining the 
development of the Poor Laws in the United 
Kingdom. 
' 
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